The Wild Mid-West: Missouri Ethics and Campaign Finance Under a Narrowed Corruption Regime by Schnurbusch, Dan
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 4 Fall 2015 Article 19 
Fall 2015 
The Wild Mid-West: Missouri Ethics and Campaign Finance Under 
a Narrowed Corruption Regime 
Dan Schnurbusch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dan Schnurbusch, The Wild Mid-West: Missouri Ethics and Campaign Finance Under a Narrowed 
Corruption Regime, 80 MO. L. REV. (2015) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/19 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 LAW SUMMARY 
The Wild Mid-West: Missouri Ethics and 
Campaign Finance Under a Narrowed 
Corruption Regime 
DAN SCHNURBUSCH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Missouri is home to some of the weakest ethics and campaign finance 
laws in the nation.1  In Missouri, there are no limits to monetary donations 
made directly to political hopefuls, no parameters on the size or type of 
“gifts” given to legislators by lobbyists, and no restriction on the ability of the 
legislators themselves to become lobbyists immediately after leaving office.2  
This sort of financial freedom can result in the literal purchasing of access 
and influence in the legislative arena, but it can similarly exert other types of 
pressure on the governor as state executive, and even over the judiciary, de-
spite Missouri’s modified method of appointing some of its judges.  Put dif-
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2016; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I would 
like to thank my wife, Molly, for her unwavering support throughout law school, and 
also my parents, Kevin and Lesa, for always teaching me how to think, never what to 
think. 
 1. See Contribution Limits: An Overview, NAT’L COUNCIL ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-contribution-limits-
overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (explaining that Missouri is one of six 
states in the nation with no limits on direct campaign donations by corporations); 
Steve Kraske, Missouri Lawmakers Take (Baby) Steps On Ethics, KAN. CITY STAR 
(Feb. 13, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/government-
politics/article10138985.html (quoting House Representative Jay Barnes as saying 
that Missouri “has the weakest ethics laws in the country”); St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
Editorial Bd., Editorial, Missouri Lawmakers Give Ethics Bill the Silent Treatment, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/
news/opinion/columns/the-platform/editorial-missouri-lawmakers-give-ethics-bill-
the-silent-treatment/article_f7d0a3a3-5c03-5162-a5e2-adc4156c6727.html; Virginia 
Young, Missouri Senate Backs More Disclosure But Doesn’t Ban Lobbyist Gifts, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 4, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/govt-and-politics/missouri-senate-backs-more-disclosure-but-doesn-t-ban-
lobbyist/article_a2c2fb9a-f627-5e11-9f4c-4ba3ea181108.html (noting that Missouri 
is the only state to have neither limits on campaign contributions nor restrictions on 
lobbyist gifts). 
 2. See Marshall Griffin, Missouri House and Senate Considering Wide Range 
of Ethics Reforms, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Feb. 3, 2015), http://news.stlpublic
radio.org/post/missouri-house-and-senate-considering-wide-range-ethics-reforms. 
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ferently, the effects of money on the creation and application of the law per-
vade all three branches of our ostensibly republican form of government, and 
Missouri’s ethical and campaign finance laws are ill equipped to protect 
against even the most basic form of corruption – that which the Supreme 
Court of the United States has identified as “quid pro quo corruption.”3 
Exacerbating these concerns are the recent Supreme Court of the United 
States’ decisions of Citizens United4 and McCutcheon5 that have unshackled 
independent special interest spending.  At the same time, these decisions have 
bound the hands of state legislators around the country, leaving lawmakers 
unable to promulgate legislation to provide continuity and consistency be-
tween the rich and the poor and between individuals and corporations in both 
their ability to access our elected representatives and in their ability to see 
their interests protected under the law. 
This Note explores some of the history of Missouri’s attempts at ethics 
reform, recent developments in Missouri’s ethics legislation and federal First 
Amendment jurisprudence, and how these issues commingle to produce a 
dangerous climate in which to operate a representative democracy.  This Note 
confronts some of the Supreme Court’s conclusions in both Citizens United 
and McCutcheon, exposes some of the deleterious societal and legal effects of 
these rulings, and provides some possible courses of action that Missouri and 
other states might undertake in order to help lay the groundwork for uphold-
ing meaningful campaign finance regulation in the future. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 Ethical rules for Missouri courts and legislators are intimately inter-
twined with the laws of campaign finance.  After all, the ability to give freely 
to campaigns for public office loses some of its value if the recipients of 
those monetary donations are legally proscribed from accepting them.  To 
address these twin concepts, Part II of this Note explores the recent historical 
background in Missouri ethics and campaign finance law.  As scrutinized in 
greater detail in Part IV below, the ability to spend and receive large sums of 
money can have significant effects on the political process both in the crea-
tion and application of the law. 
The ebb and flow of Missouri’s commitment to ethics reform has been a 
pervasive element throughout the recent history of Missouri government.  At 
times, Missouri citizens and legislators alike have expressed unwavering 
commitment to improving our representative democracy by ridding it of cor-
ruption or particularized adherence to special interest groups.  At other times, 
different ways of thinking, different interests, and different people in power 
have worked to retain the status quo and, in some cases, to roll back former 
efforts at reform.  Today, it seems as though Missouri is posturing for a return 
 
 3. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310–11 (2010). 
 4. Id. 
 5. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
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to a more reformist mentality.  But looking back, modern trends at weeding 
out corruption and in promoting legitimacy in representative government 
began a little over twenty years ago. 
Missouri’s first foray into formalized ethical reform occurred in 1991 
with the establishment of the Missouri Ethics Commission (“Ethics Commis-
sion”).6  The duties of the Ethics Commission were to observe and identify 
ethical red flags relevant to Missouri lawmakers and to propose suggestions 
to remedy them, and additionally to investigate ethics complaints, record and 
file campaign finance disclosure laws, and more.7  Met with little opposition, 
the establishment of the Ethics Commission served as a signal of Missouri’s 
commitment to reform.  Later, in 1992, Missouri voters amended the state 
constitution to impose Missouri’s first term limits on the members of both 
houses of the legislature, which led to a wide-scale turnover in house and 
senate seats by 2002.8  In 1994, Missouri passed, by a landslide, a massive 
campaign finance reform bill – SB 650 – and a ballot initiative – Proposition 
A – limiting campaign donations by committees, individuals, and political 
parties to a meager $100-$1000.9  The bills together further barred fundrais-
ing during session, required donor disclosure, and even constrained the quan-
tity of money their committees and the candidates themselves could spend on 
their own campaigns.10  Proposition A enacted stricter contribution limits 
than the statute passed by the legislature, but when the Eighth Circuit de-
clared Proposition A’s donation limits unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment in 1995, the dormant statute once again took effect.11 
Over the subsequent years, courts would invalidate many components of 
both the bill and ballot initiative.12  Nonetheless, these bills were the indicia 
of a broader trend toward legitimizing the political system in Missouri during 
that time period.  As more time passed, the Missouri legislature continued to 
 
 6. L.1991, S.B. No. 262 (codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 105.955 (2000)), re-
pealed by L.2015, S.B. No. 58, § A (eff. Aug. 28, 2015). 
 7. See § 105.955(1). 
 8. MO. CONST. art. III, § 8 (imposing eight-year term limits on service in each 
house of the General Assembly, with a sixteen-year aggregate limit). 
 9. The variance was dependent upon the office for which a given candidate was 
running.  See SB 650 (codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 130.032 (2000), repealed by 
2008 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 1038 (West)); Missouri Campaign Contribution Limits 
Act, Proposition A (1994), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Campaign
_Contribution_Limits,_Proposition_A_%281994%29 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) 
(Proposition A in fact limited donations to $100–$300 depending on the office). 
 10. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 11. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 644 (8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating § 
130.100, Proposition A’s campaign contribution limits). 
 12. See, e.g., id.; Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. 
Mo. 1996) (invalidating § 130.032(4), which prohibited legislative officials from 
accepting donations during session); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422 
(8th Cir. 1995) (invalidating SB 650’s candidate expenditure limits, the prohibition on 
carryover contributions, and affirming the invalidation of a negative advertisement 
disclosure requirement, all under the First Amendment). 
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identify ethical shortcomings, and in 1997, the aforementioned 1994 law was 
amended to include new rules regarding the definition and regulation of lob-
byists, to address a variety of conflicts of interest, and to add a host of new 
financial reporting and disclosure requirements.13 
But, as history has shown us, sometimes change can occur too hastily 
for some, and so the year 2006 marked the beginning of Missouri’s return to 
the “Wild West”14 when Governor Matt Blunt signed into law a bill that elim-
inated all limits on direct campaign contributions to candidates for political 
office.15  Missouri legislators had been systemically engaging in questionable 
financial practices, such as the trading of funds between committees and other 
financial tricks, in order to get otherwise impermissible donations to the in-
tended candidates.16  As a result, some of the ostensibly more conscientious 
elected officials sought not to eliminate these unsavory practices, but to bring 
this unscrupulous conduct to the fore by simply permitting these monetary 
transmissions that may regardless occur, while at once subjecting them to 
enhanced disclosure requirements.17 
However, less than six months later, the Supreme Court of Missouri up-
held a trial court ruling invalidating a portion of the bill as unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.18  Because the offending 
provisions were not severable from the remainder of the bill, it was deemed 
wholly invalid and the court’s ruling thereby reinstated the preexisting caps 
on campaign donations.19  Successfully remedying the invalidity of the 2006 
 
 13. L.1997, S.B. No. 16, § A (codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 105.473 (Cum. 
Supp. 2013)). 
 14. See Rudi Keller, Publisher’s Parties Highlight Reporting Issues in Missouri 
Ethics Laws, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2015), http://www.columbia
tribune.com/news/politics/publisher-s-parties-highlight-reporting-issues-in-missouri-
ethics-laws/article_69ad2711-1a40-5c2a-9764-66bff693989a.html (describing lobby-
ist-sponsored parties for the Missouri General Assembly and the failure of disclosure 
requirements to adequately address the appearance of impropriety).  See also Dierdre 
Shesgreen, McCaskill Seeks to Curb Influence of Missouri Mega-Donor, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 7, 2014, 12:07 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/12/07/
mccaskill-sinquefield-republican-donor-missouri-conservatives/19950199/ (noting 
U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill’s disdain for Missouri’s “wild west,” laissez-faire 
brand of politics). 
 15. 2007 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 1900 (West), declared unconstitutional by Trout 
v. State, 231 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. 2007) (en banc)) (attempting to repeal MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 130.032 (2000), repealed by 2008 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 1038 (West)); see also 
Jeffrey Milyo & John Samples, Contribution Limits Silence Missouri Voters, 
COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB. (June 13, 2006), http://archive.columbiatribune.com/
2006/Jun/20060613Comm011.asp. 
 16. David A. Lieb, Missouri Campaign Contribution Limits Repealed, 
COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (July 12, 2008), http://www.columbiamissourian.com/
a/104227/missouri-campaign-contribution-limits-repealed/. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Trout, 231 S.W.3d at 148. 
 19. See id. 
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bill, Governor Matt Blunt and the Missouri legislature tried again in 2008 by 
passing a modified bill purporting to once again remove caps on direct and 
indirect campaign contributions,20 and no bills have passed since that time 
limiting campaign contributions.21 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Many years have passed since Missouri’s first attempts at formalized 
ethical reform, but the battle wages ever on between the First Amendment in 
electioneering behavior and the ideals of a regulated, transparent, and repre-
sentative democracy.  Part III of this Note touches on the manner in which 
sweeping decisions from our nation’s highest court have impacted Missouri 
elections and legislative freedom and what, if anything, has been done in 
Missouri in light of these novel developments. 
A.  Citizens United, McCutcheon, and the Explosion of Non-Candidate 
Spending 
Written about at length, the federal cases of Citizens United v. FEC and 
McCutcheon v. FEC have magnified and transformed the methods of getting 
elected for most state and federal publicly elected officials.  Where Citizens 
United declared legislative attempts to rein in corporate independent election-
eering expenditures to be unconstitutional,22 McCutcheon held that statutory 
caps on aggregate amounts a donor may spend across all political candidates 
violated the First Amendment.23  Together, these two decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States have had a dramatic impact on independent 
electioneering expenditures and campaign spending more generally.24   
 
 20. 2008 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 1038 (West) (repealing MO. REV. STAT. § 
130.032 (2000)). 
 21. See Robert M. Stern, Sunlight State By State After Citizens United: How 
State Legislation Has Responded to Citizens United, CORP. REFORM COALITION 21 
(June 2012), https://www.citizen.org/documents/sunlight-state-by-state-report.pdf; 
see also sources cited supra note 1. 
 22. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 23. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 24. Explored in greater detail infra Part IV.A.  See, e.g., Joanna Shepherd & 
Michael Kang, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, Television Advertising and State 
Supreme Court Justices’ Decisions In Criminal Cases, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & 
POL’Y (2014), skewedjustice.org/; Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Ap-
proaches (and One Right One) To Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 21 (2014) (describing a dramatic expansion in independent campaign spending 
following Citizens United); Michele L. Jawando & Sean Wright, Why Courts Matter, 
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1.  Citizens United and the Unshackling of Corporate Electioneering 
Citizens United wrestled with the interplay between corporate and union 
identity and the ability to spend money on political speech.25  More specifi-
cally, the Court was tasked with resolving the question of whether it was con-
stitutionally permissible to restrict corporate or union spending on independ-
ent electioneering communications under the First Amendment, provided the 
corporations or unions and the candidates themselves did not coordinate in 
the presentation of the message.26  In declaring the restrictions unconstitu-
tional, the Court explained that “the Government may not suppress political 
speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”27  In essence, the 
Court’s ruling freed corporations and unions to spend unlimited sums of 
money on political advertising supporting or condemning various political 
issues or individual candidates for political office.28 
At issue in Citizens United was a pay-per-view movie regarding then-
Senator Hillary Clinton that the Court had concluded was an electioneering 
communication produced for the purpose of persuading voters that she was 
“unfit for the Presidency.”29  An “electioneering communication,” the Court 
explained, is defined as “‘any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication’ 
that ‘refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office’ and is made 
within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election.”30  But, the larg-
er question was whether this electioneering communication was regulable at 
all when the distinction being drawn by the legislature was solely on the basis 
of the “speaker’s corporate identity.”31 
The Court found that the massive regulatory structure tasked with over-
seeing electioneering communications created a de facto prior restraint,32 and 
provided discretionary authority so broad as to permit regulators to squelch 
otherwise protected speech.33  Furthermore, because of the protracted nature 
of litigation surrounding the speech at issue, and the “onerous restrictions” 
associated with the creation of a Political Action Committee (“PAC”),34 regu-
latory hurdles would often moot the necessity of the speech itself, in that the 
elections about which the entity sought to speak would have long since 
 
 25. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41. 
 26. Id. at 356–57 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976)) (recogniz-
ing that the ban on cooperation between the donor and the candidate fell within the 
definition of “contribution”). 
 27. Id. at 365. 
 28. Id. at 355–56. 
 29. Id. at 325. 
 30. Id. at 321 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2012)). 
 31. See id. at 348. 
 32. Id. at 335. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 338–39. 
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passed.35  In essence, the Court explained, “If parties want to avoid litigation 
and the possibility of civil and criminal penalties, they must either refrain 
from speaking or ask the FEC to issue an advisory opinion approving the 
political speech in question.”36 
The upshot of this, the Court reasoned, was an effective ban on speech, 
because restricting the amount of money that an entity may spend on political 
communication “necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting 
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of 
the audience reached.”37  Because this was “political speech” for the purpose 
of First Amendment analysis, strict scrutiny was applied, giving rise to the 
government’s three proposed compelling state interests:38 (1) the Austin 
Court’s “anti-distortion” interest,39 (2) an anti-corruption interest, and (3) a 
shareholder-protection interest.40 
The Court systematically dismantled the government’s anti-distortion 
interest, which was premised on the notion that there was a “corrosive and 
distort[ive] effect[] of immense aggregations of wealth that [were] accumu-
lated with the help of the corporate form and that [had] little or no correlation 
to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”41  In dismissing 
this interest, the Court believed that this reasoning would permit the govern-
ment to silence or diminish the speech of news media corporations, as they 
technically utilize wealth accumulated through the corporate form, and their 
opinions may not correlate with public sentiment.42  The Court further rea-
soned that such a rationale would still permit large corporations to lobby and 
directly contact legislators, while practical and monetary limitations binding 
smaller corporations would prohibit the same, and that it would maintain an 
arbitrary divide between the speech of individuals and unincorporated associ-
 
 35. Id. at 334 (“Today, Citizens United finally learns, two years after the fact, 
whether it could have spoken during the 2008 Presidential primary—long after the 
opportunity to persuade primary voters has passed.”). 
 36. Id. at 336. 
 37. Id. at 339 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)). 
 38. Id. at 340.  The majority pointed out that in Buckley, the Court had already 
invalidated a previous ban on independent electioneering expenditures because the 
state’s interest in the “prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” was 
not met in “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination.”  Id. at 345 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 47). 
 39. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (premised on a 
compelling state interest relating to the distortionary effect of corporate spending, the 
Court upheld statutory caps on independent electioneering expenditures by corpora-
tions and unions), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 40. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–49. 
 41. Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660). 
 42. Id. at 351–54.  The Court went on to point out that the anti-distortion interest 
further loses credibility when one considers that 96% of corporations have fewer than 
100 employees, and 75% earn less than $1 million per year – the Court found this 
hardly representative of the Austin court’s fear of “immense aggregations of wealth.”  
Id. at 354. 
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ations and the speech of those who have chosen to incorporate their busi-
ness.43 
The government’s anti-corruption interest failed when the court ex-
plained, “When Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest 
was limited to quid pro quo corruption.”44  Further, the majority determined 
that the mere “appearance of influence or access” cannot give rise to a loss of 
faith in democracy, because the fact that a person or corporation is willing to 
spend money to persuade the electorate “presupposes that the people have the 
ultimate influence over elected officials.”45 
The government’s “shareholder protection” interest was rejected on sim-
ilar grounds to the anti-distortion interest: The majority opined that “protect-
ing dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund corporate political 
speech” would similarly permit the government to silence news media corpo-
rations, in addition to the statute’s concurrently over-inclusive and under-
inclusive nature.46 
In Justice Stevens’ “emphatic[]” dissenting opinion, he warned that this 
decision would “undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the 
Nation,” and chided the majority’s assertion that Austin was an outlier deci-
sion, noting that the majority’s opinion relied almost entirely on a string of 
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinions while simultaneously “disavowing a 
body of case law.”47  His first salvo consisted of an attack on the majority’s 
willingness to facially invalidate Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), when Citizens United had dropped its facial 
challenge to the law.48  This left the government in the position of having 
never compiled an evidentiary record to support the notion that there were 
widespread harmful impacts of corporate and union independent electioneer-
ing.49  Justice Stevens’ dissent explained that Congress had created BCRA in 
response to a “virtual mountain of research on the corruption that previous 
legislation had failed to avert.  The Court now negates Congress’ efforts 
without a shred of evidence on how Section 203 or its state-law counterparts 
have been affecting any entity other than Citizens United.”50 
 
 43. Id. at 355–56. 
 44. Id. at 359. 
 45. Id. at 360.  In essence, the Court refused to accept the notion that money 
spent on an independent basis for electioneering efforts, and not given directly to 
candidates, was improperly affecting the behavior of legislators.  See id.  Even if we 
did have evidence of undue influence, the Court noted, “The remedies enacted by law 
. . . must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our tradition that 
more speech, not less, is the governing rule.”  Id. at 361. 
 46. Id. at 361. 
 47. Id. at 395 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48. Id. at 396–97. 
 49. Id. at 456–57. 
 50. Id. at 400.  As an additional attack on the procedural legitimacy of the major-
ity opinion, the dissent struck at the majority’s failure to adhere to stare decisis with-
8
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After a barrage against the majority’s argument on various procedural 
grounds, Justice Stevens proceeded to dig into the meat and potatoes of the 
majority’s First Amendment justification for overturning the independent 
expenditure restrictions.51  The dissent engaged the notion that this was a 
“ban” on speech, explaining that it was not an “absolute ban”; the regulation 
only applied within a narrow time window and affected only a specified class 
of communications.52  Further, corporations and unions were free to create 
PACs in which “‘stockholders and their families and [the] executive or ad-
ministrative personnel and their families’ can pool their resources to finance 
electioneering communications.”53  Justice Stevens additionally noted that 
this “ban” only applied to electioneering, and not to the far more substantial 
“issue advertising.”54  Rebutting Justice Kennedy’s fears of the law being 
used to squelch the news media, Justice Stevens went on to point out that the 
law explicitly exempts news media companies from its proscriptions “in 
recognition of the unique role played by the institutional press in sustaining 
public debate,” in addition to a litany of further exemptions and other pre-
served freedoms.55 
Justice Stevens, perturbed by Justice Kennedy’s characterization of the 
“ban,” argued that it is at best a “time, place, and manner restriction” apply-
ing solely to communications meeting a six-element test56 during a particular-
ly vulnerable point in the election process.57  Justice Stevens scoffed at the 
notion that the law “silenced” corporations, distraught at Justice Kennedy’s 
suggestion that the FEC’s sole “business is to censor,” and in Justice Kenne-
dy’s reliance on an inapposite bit of constitutional law.58 
 
out an adequate basis, arguing that the majority’s rationale for overturning Austin was 
simply that “it does not like Austin,” and the dissent remained unimpressed with the 
majority’s attempts to supplement this perceived weakness with “ruminations” about 
the changing dynamic of American speech.  Id. at 409–10.  Justice Stevens instead 
looked to traditional considerations to the stare decisis analysis, such as reliance, 
antiquity, and unworkability, noting that state legislatures around the country have 
relied on the ability to regulate independent expenditures for over a century, that Aus-
tin and state regulatory statutes had been in place for generations, and further that 
there was no suggestion that Austin was unworkable.  Id. at 412–13.  He then cau-
tioned that this ruling will “dramatically enhance[] the role of corporations and un-
ions—and the narrow interests they represent—vis-à-vis the role of political parties—
and the broad coalitions they represent—in determining who will hold public office.”  
Id. at 412. 
 51. Id. at 414–15. 
 52. Id. at 415. 
 53. Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(A)(i) (2012)). 
 54. Id. at 416. 
 55. Id. at 417. 
 56. Id. at 418–19. 
 57. Id. at 419. 
 58. Id. at 419 n.39.  Furthermore, in confronting the majority’s primary argument 
that the law cannot distinguish based solely on the corporate identity, Justice Stevens 
cited a string of cases where the state imposed varying restrictions on speech based 
9
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Justice Stevens distinguished Bellotti on numerous fronts from the case 
at bar and recited the myriad ways in which the majority’s reliance on it was 
misplaced.59  He recited historical texts and prior Supreme Court opinions 
recognizing a broader understanding of corruption that included “undue in-
fluence,” arguing that “the difference between selling a vote and selling ac-
cess is a matter of degree, not kind.”60  Justice Stevens emphasized the con-
tinued value of an expanded anti-corruption interest and noted that the ma-
jority’s reliance on the fact that there were no “direct examples of votes being 
exchanged for . . . expenditures” was patently ridiculous, not only because the 
amalgam of motivations contributing to what may or may not ultimately cor-
rupt a legislator is unknowable, but also because “no one will acknowledge 
that he sold a vote.”61 
The dissent concluded its discussion after a spirited defense of Austin’s 
anti-distortion interest and the government’s shareholder protection interest.62  
To Justice Stevens, the anti-distortion interest was “manifestly not just an 
‘equalizing’ ideal in disguise,” it was a conception that recognized the dis-
tinct form that corporations embody, and their distinct motives for speech.63  
The anti-distortion interest was a mechanism by which to ensure that natural 
speakers did not become drowned out and disillusioned with the political 
process and to shelter corporations from feeling forced into economically 
inefficient “rent seeking” behavior64 – behavior that was also undertaken with 
funds, aggregated through the corporate form, that belonged to shareholders 
who were now forced to choose between maintaining financial holdings for 
purely economic purposes in a corporation that may espouse political view-
points they disagree with, or selling those shares, risking the imposition of 
taxes or other practical burdens.65 
 
solely on the speaker’s identity, including the majority’s own identity-based distinc-
tion necessary to uphold the disclosure requirements within the context of the majori-
ty opinion itself.  Id. at 421–22.  Justice Stevens provided a historical overview of his 
view of the Framers’ recognition of the limited role of corporations, and of the Fram-
ers’ cautious acceptance of even the basic propriety of the corporation as a concept.  
Id. at 425–30.  Justice Stevens further noted that the First Amendment even permitted 
some distinctions to be drawn when it enshrined the freedom of speech and of the 
press, and in referencing the fact that the First Amendment by its text only restricts 
Congress, and not executive regulatory agencies.  Id. at 431. 
 59. Id. at 441–45. 
 60. Id. at 447. 
 61. Id. at 455. 
 62. Id. at 465–78. 
 63. Id. at 465. 
 64. Id. at 464, 470–72.  For more on rent seeking, see discussion infra Part IV. 
 65. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 475–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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2.  McCutcheon and the Proliferation of Monetary Influence 
While the ink has hardly dried on the McCutcheon decision, the holding 
on its face suggests a precipitous expansion of money into the political pro-
cess.  In its opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the 
government’s proposed purpose for the aggregate limits66 – to prevent cor-
ruption based on the circumvention of the “base limits”67 – was not met by 
such aggregate limits.68   The Court reasoned that the restrictions imposed a 
significant impediment to participation in government and therefore were 
invalid under the First Amendment.69  In so holding, the Court was explicit in 
continuing to cabin the notion of corruption to merely “quid pro quo” corrup-
tion – money in exchange for political favors – rather than a more expansive 
definition including undue access and influence.70  The majority recited that 
government regulation intended to attack more than mere quid pro quo cor-
ruption “impermissibly inject[s] Government ‘into the debate over who 
should govern.’”71  The Court’s ruling in McCutcheon further expanded the 
ability of corporations and individual citizens alike to influence the outcome 
of elections in as many places as desired. 
In explaining that the aggregate limits “prohibit an individual from fully 
contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more 
candidates,” the Court reasoned that the limits “deny the individual all ability 
to exercise his expressive and associational rights by contributing to someone 
who will advocate for his policy preferences.”72  Furthermore, the Court was 
fearful of the government having a role in determining which types of speech 
are “useful.”73 
The government relied on only one compelling interest – that of pre-
venting corruption or the appearance thereof.74  The Court reasoned that, if 
the base limits of $5200 are not considered to cause corruption for the first 
nine recipients, it makes little sense that the tenth recipient and beyond would 
become corrupt by that same amount.75  Therefore, if additional donations 
 
 66. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 
441a(a)(3) (2012)) (“[A]ggregate limits restrict how much money a donor may con-
tribute in total to all candidates or committees.”). 
 67. Id. (citing § 441a(a)(1)) (“Base limits restrict how much money a donor may 
contribute to a particular candidate or committee.”). 
 68. Id. at 1437. 
 69. Id. at 1438. 
 70. Id. at 1441. 
 71. Id. (citing Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 
2806, 2826 (2011)). 
 72. Id. at 1448. 
 73. Id. at 1449.  The remainder of the majority opinion is spent applying strict 
scrutiny to the aggregate limits, relying on the distinction in the standard of review 
between contributions and expenditures articulated in Buckley.  See id. at 1449–62. 
 74. Id. at 1450. 
 75. Id. at 1451. 
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would not corrupt further candidates, the only basis upon which to sustain the 
aggregate limits would be on a showing that they prevented the circumven-
tion of the base limits.76  In entertaining several theories about how the base 
limits could be circumvented in the absence of aggregate limits, the majority 
asserted that they would all be illegal, implausible, or not born out by real 
world experience.77  The Court detailed the inefficiency and irrationality of 
donating to multiple PACs or committees under the expectation that a contri-
bution would ultimately reach a candidate, and the fact that most organiza-
tions independent of the candidate themselves do not re-gift donations direct-
ly to candidates – they instead use that money on alternative forms of elec-
tioneering.78 
The majority offered alternative solutions to prevent circumvention of 
the base limits that did not involve aggregate caps on donations, such as 
tightening the permissive transfer rules regulating inter-committee fund trans-
fers,79 strengthening the preexisting earmarking regulations, or a modified 
version of current aggregate caps.80  The Court refrained from opining as to 
the constitutional validity of these suggestions, but the majority wanted to 
make the point that “there are numerous alternative approaches available to 
Congress to prevent circumvention of the base limits.”81 
To further assuage concerns, the majority briefly discussed the value of 
disclosure requirements in the Internet age, noting that they may “deter actual 
corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contri-
butions and expenditures to the light of publicity,”82 and that the legislature 
may – with aggregate limits – be in fact encouraging donors to contribute to 
other organizations such as 501(c) groups not subject to donor disclosure 
requirements.83  In concluding its opinion, the majority stated that the aggre-
gate limits “[did] not further the only governmental interest this Court accept-
ed as legitimate in Buckley.”84 
The dissent pounced, deriding the ruling as “eviscerate[ing] our Na-
tion’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the 
grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws were intended to 
resolve.”85  The dissent argued that the majority’s holding was flawed, in that 
it (1) relied on an improper definition of “corruption,” (2) ignored the contin-
ued need for aggregate limits, even in light of new regulations, and (3) failed 
 
 76. Id. at 1452. 
 77. Id. at 1454–55. 
 78. Id. at 1457. 
 79. Id. at 1458–59. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1459. 
 82. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976)). 
 83. Id. at 1460 (noting that “[s]uch organizations spent some $300 million on 
independent expenditures in the 2012 election cycle”). 
 84. Id. at 1462. 
 85. Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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to recognize that the aggregate limits were in fact narrowly tailored, as there 
existed no viable substitute presented in evidence.86 
The dissent advocated for the broader, traditional definition of “corrup-
tion” detailed in McConnell and prior decisions that included not only quid 
pro quo corruption, but also undue “influence over or access to elected offi-
cials.”87  Justice Breyer explained that the entirety of the anti-corruption anal-
ysis must fall within First Amendment considerations, not only because the 
First Amendment serves to ensure that elected representatives are “responsive 
to the will of the people,” but because the speech interests of large donors are 
not the only speech interests at issue.88  According to Justice Breyer, all forms 
of corruption, not just quid pro quo corruption, break the “‘chain of commu-
nication’ between the people and their representatives” – “[w]here enough 
money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard.”89 
Much like the dissent in Citizens United, Justice Breyer further sought 
to demonstrate how “corruption” includes notions of undue access and influ-
ence, again citing the McConnell record, which “showed, in detail, . . . the 
web of relationships and understandings among parties, candidates, and large 
donors that underlies privileged access and influence.”90  Most importantly, 
“[T]he record did ‘not contain any evidence of bribery or vote buying in ex-
change for donations of nonfederal money.’”91  In other words, there was not 
a “single discrete instance of quid pro quo corruption” as a result of soft 
money donations.92  The record did, however, demonstrate pervasive access 
by large contributors directly to their favored lawmaker.93 
Additionally, this narrowed definition of corruption, the dissent pointed 
out, was flatly inconsistent with McConnell and its predecessors, and the 
Court even in Citizens United never explicitly overruled McConnell.94  In 
fact, the dissent argued, the Court in Citizens United expressly distinguished 
soft money donations from independent electioneering expenditures, and 
even the plurality opinion in the instant case stated that it did not purport to 
overrule McConnell, and yet continued with the corruption analysis without 
 
 86. Id. at 1465–66. 
 87. Id. at 1470–71 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003), over-
ruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010)). 
 88. Id. at 1467 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1469 (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 146–52, 154–57, 167–71, 182–
84). 
 91. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 481 (D.C. Circuit 
2003), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93)). 
 92. Id. at 1469–70.  Soft money donations are those to a party rather than an 
individual candidate, thereby avoiding various legal limitations.  Id. at 1469.  It also 
refers to money spent by independent organizations on advertising and other forms of 
political electioneering not associated directly with the election or defeat of a candi-
date.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 1470. 
 94. Id. at 1471. 
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incorporating the “broader definition of corruption, on which McConnel’s 
holding depends.”  The dissent placed this all on display to demonstrate that 
confining the notion of “corruption” to mere quid pro quo fell sorely short of 
reality and was inconsistent with precedent. 
The dissent then expounded upon the second prong of its argument: the 
continued need for the aggregate limits, citing three possible circumstances in 
which the base limits could be circumvented: (1) a big, aggregated check to 
the national party to be transferred to committees and candidates around the 
country as necessary, perhaps solicited by the candidates themselves in ex-
change for favors;95 (2) a possible total of $3.6 million in donations to indi-
vidual candidates across the country to help the party’s position generally, a 
dollar amount which can be expanded by the creation of new committees;96 
and (3) through the proliferation of PACs, into which large sums of capital 
could be funneled in otherwise limited portions to candidates around the 
country.97 
The last piece of the dissent’s argument rested on the narrow tailoring of 
the aggregate limits, pointing out that the plurality opinion suggests its possi-
ble alternatives without any evidence in the record or supplementing any ba-
sis of its own in support of the possible alternatives.  In fact, the plurality did 
not “opine on the validity of any particular proposal,” the dissent speculated 
this was because they rest on dubious constitutional ground.98  In support of 
the “narrowly tailored” component of the strict scrutiny analysis, the dissent 
found no “substantial mismatch between Congress’ legitimate objective and 
the means selected to achieve it.”99 
In concluding, the dissent noted that decisions such as these regarding 
compelling state interests are typically made on the basis of a full and com-
plete factual record.100  Even on what record did exist, the plurality and dis-
sent disagree on the factual possibilities that exist under the law, further 
strengthening the support for a robust evidentiary record.101 
 
 95. Id. at 1472.  The dissent articulates a situation, absent aggregate limits, in 
which political parties could form single “Joint Party Committees” of which all party 
and candidate committees could become members, whereupon a donor could write a 
single massive check that the Joint Committee would then distribute to each member 
committee in accordance with the legal limits.  Id. 
 96. Id. at 1473.  The dissent explains that this same process (i.e., the Joint Party 
Committee) could be expanded to facilitate direct funding to individual candidate 
campaigns as well.  Id.  The dissent further explains that this may also allow for the 
various committees to engage in a legal sleight of hand such that a single candidate 
may receive direct donations far in excess of the direct donation limits.  Id. 
 97. Id. at 1474.  The dissent describes a circumstance in which many donors 
would give the maximum allowable limits to 200 PACs, and the PACs would in turn 
give the maximum amount – $10,000 – to “embattled” candidates.  Id. 
 98. Id. at 1479. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1480. 
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B.  The Fight Continues for a More Ethical Missouri 
With the Supreme Court’s decisions in Citizens United and McCutcheon 
now in play, state and federal ethics laws are all that remain to guard against 
any perceptions of impropriety engendered by the effects of money on poli-
tics.  At the time of this writing, concerns regarding the ethical behavior of 
Missouri legislators are once again taking center stage, and committee leaders 
and headstrong representatives are undertaking attempts at reform.102  As 
legislators, committee leaders, and the media bear witness to regulatory 
committee meetings held at private country clubs with food and refreshment 
supplied by the very industries whose regulation is under consideration,103 
even the most resolute defenders of relaxed ethical rules are today taking 
pause.104  Likewise, Missouri’s lack of campaign donation and lobbyist gift 
limits have begun to raise questions for some legislators regarding the degree 
to which money and access ought to command both the figurative volume 
and influence of one’s voice, particularly against the backdrop of Citizens 
United and McCutcheon.  However, bills and amendments purporting to de-
velop a more conscientious Missouri government often fall on deaf ears.105  
On the one hand, it may come as no surprise that those in whose favor the 
benefits of loose ethics laws inure might find it difficult to voluntarily muster 
up the motivation to make hard changes to the way they do business.  On the 
other hand, what type of unwanted pressure might legislators feel as a result 
of both tremendous donations and independent expenditures executed on their 
behalf? 
Despite such impediments, 2015 has thus far taken on a distinctly re-
formist tone.106  There have been a series of ethics reform bills in both houses 
of the Missouri legislature, and some have even made strong headway.107  
Opposition still thrives, however, and many advocate solely for more disclo-
sure, to the exclusion of limits on donations or lobbyist gifts.108  For many 
state legislators, the best way to combat corruption is to make the data regard-
ing donations and lobbyist gifts plain and publicly available.109  After all, if 
the citizenry is fairly apprised of the circumstances with all the information 
laid before them, they ought to be equipped with the tools necessary to ade-
quately determine the proper manner in which to vote next time they find 
themselves at the ballot box – right? 
 
 102. See Griffin, supra note 2; Kraske, supra note 1. 
 103. See, e.g., KRCG: “Lobbyist-Funded Dinners Continue Amid Scrutiny,”  
YOUTUBE (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oYe3m-Oa_Pg. 
 104. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 105. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch Editorial Bd., supra note 1 (arguing that con-
flicts of interest will create the need for a ballot measure if Missouri truly desires 
comprehensive ethics reform). 
 106. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Young, supra note 1. 
 109. Id. 
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But tales of frivolity at lavish lobbyist-sponsored parties have suggested 
to some Missouri representatives that mere disclosure requirements either fail 
to meet the mark or inadequately safeguard against the sort of behavior 
sought to be ferretted out.110  To combat what some in the General Assembly 
view as improper, the former Missouri House Speaker, Republican John 
Diehl, took strides to stamp out this type of arrangement, instructing the vari-
ous committee chairmen that “there will be no more food or meals served 
during committee meetings inside the Capitol.”111  But, no formal modifica-
tions to the rules or the law have been made to enforce his admonitions or to 
carry them forward into future terms, and no steps have been taken to prevent 
the holding of meetings at country clubs or other untoward choices of ven-
ue.112  Following John Diehl’s resignation, Republican Todd Richardson was 
elected in his place, and he at least ostensibly appears to share some of 
Diehl’s vigor for ethics reform – albeit hopefully not all of Diehl’s vigor.113  
Fortunately for reform advocates, at least some steps toward course-
correcting this ship adrift have begun to take form; but, what is the furthest 
extent to which Missouri can constitutionally regulate ethics and campaign 
finance?  And if it turns out that Missouri cannot go as far as it needs to, what 
can we do to rethink the problem and chart a path forward? 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Missouri finds itself in a bubbling mire of unlimited direct campaign 
contributions and lobbyist gifts, unimpeded independent electioneering ex-
penditures, and unstoppable tycoons of monetary political persuasion.  What 
effect is this having on Missouri and the nation more generally?  Admittedly, 
the First Amendment is a fundamental component to the freedom and integri-
ty of our democracy.  For without the freedom to voice one’s mind, there 
exists a loss in the “marketplace of ideas,”114 the sense of personhood and 
individualism accompanying a person’s right to speak out, and a restriction 
upon the ability of the electorate to knowledgeably hold elected officials ac-
 
 110. Id.   
 111. Griffin, supra note 2. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Summer Ballentine, Lawmakers Fail to Ramp Up Ethics Laws for Missouri 
Officials, WASH. TIMES (May 24, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2015/may/24/lawmakers-fail-to-ramp-up-ethics-laws-for-missouri/?page=all (describ-
ing Richardson’s desire to “ramp up” the legislature’s intern policies).  See generally 
Jason Hancock & Steve Kraske, The Wolves of Jeff City: Sexual Harassment at the 
Capitol, KAN. CITY STAR (June 26, 2015), http://www.kansascity.com/news/
government-politics/article25599589.html (describing the atmosphere of predatory 
sexual harassment at Missouri’s state capitol). 
 114. The belief that the truth will emerge from the competition of ideas by way of 
free and transparent discourse, a concept first articulated in a Supreme Court of the 
United States opinion by Justice William O. Douglas in United States v. Rumely.  345 
U.S. 41, 55 (1953). 
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countable.115  But are there competing concerns, “compelling interests,” that 
the state – that is to say, the American people – may be justified in utilizing as 
the grounds upon which to stand in restricting some of that First Amendment 
freedom?  It would seem that there are, and that they must be recognized or 
reexamined by the Supreme Court of the United States if we wish to have any 
hope of retaining our republican form of government. 
This Part explores the interaction between Missouri’s weak ethics laws 
and political spending following Citizens United and McCutcheon.  It further 
illuminates some of the societal and governmental impacts of Citizens United 
and McCutcheon that elicit cause for concern, as well as the limitations that 
these decisions currently place upon the ability of Missouri legislators to rein 
in the influence of large concentrations of political dollars if Missouri were to 
undertake legislative reform. 
A.  Weak Ethics Laws and Big Spending – What Effects Can They 
Have on Missouri and the Nation? 
Suppose a hypothetical candidate, we will call him Jim Johnson, is run-
ning for a seat in the Missouri General Assembly.  His “war chest” is not 
exactly bursting at the seams, and yet he really wants to make a difference in 
Missouri state government.  How would he go about obtaining financing for 
his goals?  Fortunately for Jim, Missouri offers upstart candidates greater 
freedom in that regard than many other states – Jim could simply find and 
solicit a single rich donor to obtain the requisite funds with which to run his 
campaign.  This is because, despite the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
illuminating exposition of the many concerns supporting a state’s “anti-
corruption” compelling interest, Missouri expressly abolished direct cam-
paign donation limits in 2008.116 
Alternatively, Jim could attend conferences and fund raisers, rubbing el-
bows with the party elite, heads of various PACs, corporations, and other 
financing groups.  Following Citizens United, business entities can spend 
unlimited sums of money on attack ads against Jim’s opponents, or spread the 
message of Jim’s impeccable character and commitment to Missouri citizens 
to voters far and wide.  Under McCutcheon, wealthy donors can fund not only 
Jim’s advertising campaign through PACs and other organizations, but can 
also contribute directly to his campaign and the campaigns of any other polit-
ical hopeful in Jefferson City and elsewhere around the country.117 
This perfect storm of pecuniary control necessarily diminishes the polit-
ical salience of average citizens relative to their wealthy counterparts.118  In 
 
 115. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1464 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
 116. 2008 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 1038 (West) (repealing MO. REV. STAT. § 
130.032 (2000)). 
 117. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442. 
 118. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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refusing to acknowledge an anti-distortion interest, whether it be viewed 
through the paradigm of egalitarianism or otherwise, the majority in Citizens 
United, under the guise of impartiality, abstained from utilizing the First 
Amendment as a method of promoting equitable representation in our repub-
lican form of government.  But, in doing so, the Court allowed the First 
Amendment, a right surely intended to be more than a token gesture, to ele-
vate the position and influence of the wealthy few relative to the remainder of 
the American citizenry, drowning out the speech of the many.  In other 
words: inaction in this case may have an effect comparable in magnitude, and 
yet more damaging to our republic than any action the court refused to take. 
Since Citizens United, there has been at least a 245% increase in outside 
presidential election spending, a 662% increase in federal House elections, 
and a whopping 1338% increase in federal senatorial independent election 
spending.119  In fact, the 2012 election cycle alone consumed over $1.3 bil-
lion in independent electioneering expenditures.120  Shockingly, this data was 
collected before McCutcheon was decided,121 and it is therefore unlikely that 
these numbers will adequately encapsulate the incomprehensible expansion 
of money in politics that has accrued since that time and that will inevitably 
accompany the 2016 election cycle. 
But of course the political process requires the presence of at least some 
money in order to function, and therefore it does not follow that more money 
in the system is necessarily a problem.  However, research tells us, for exam-
ple, that corporate and business-oriented PACs funnel funds only to legisla-
tive committee members who will be well positioned to exercise influence 
over policy in their favor,122 suggesting that they expect their donations to 
garner at least some influence over the behavior of that legislator.  We also 
know that the desire to influence policy to maximize profitability encourages 
a form of “rent seeking”123 – the practice of utilizing business funds for the 
purpose of modifying or eroding the law in a manner that inures to the benefit 
of the corporate bottom line, in turn precluding the investment of those funds 
in innovation and new technologies.124  This rent seeking behavior harms not 
 
 119. See Hasen, supra note 24, at 36 (citing DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., 
ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 44–45 (5th ed. Supp. 2013)). 
 120. Mike Ludwig, Four Years After Citizens United, Is Campaign Cash Buying 
Justice In State Courts?, TRUTHOUT (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.truth-out.org/news/
item/21368-four-years-after-citizens-united-is-campaign-cash-buying-justice-in-state-
courts#. 
 121. See Hasen, supra note 24, at 21 (describing the upcoming McCutcheon deci-
sion). 
 122. See Eleanor Neff Powell & Justin Grimmer, Money in Exile: Campaign Con-
tributions and Committee Access, STAN. U. 3–4  (May 5, 2015), http://stanford.edu/
~jgrimmer/money.pdf. 
 123. See John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, 
Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 265 (2015). 
 124. Id. at 270. 
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only shareholders, consumers, and employees,125 but also the rule of law 
more generally, as corporations and other big-money advocates have become 
empowered through a series of judicial opinions126 to deregulate and “reregu-
late” themselves over time, rendering the law less predictable, general, and 
clear.127 
Despite the Court’s dismissal of the corrupting influence of independent 
electioneering expenditures in recent decisions, we also now have data, inde-
pendent of the McConnell record,128 that demonstrates the impact of inde-
pendent expenditures on another aspect of government – the impartiality of 
the judiciary.129  Interest group contributions are associated with an increased 
 
 125. Professor Coates argues that rent seeking shifts money away from innovation 
and new technology and into things such as: (1) the growth of government affairs 
offices, and (2) the systematic overturning of regulation and law, which carries with it 
the ancillary byproduct of damaging the reputation and tenacity of regulatory agen-
cies as a concept, which in turn causes legislators to cut back on funding to such 
agencies, which ultimately leads to a reduction in staffing and relaxed enforcement of 
existing procedures, thereby perpetuating a cycle of inefficacy in regulatory oversight 
generally.  Id. at 272. 
 126. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980) (requiring “narrow tailoring” to fit the government’s purpose for 
purposes of First Amendment restrictions on corporations); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622 (1979) (extending First Amendment protections to corporate political activity); 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976) (articulating the “commercial speech” doctrine); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (holding that private, for-profit corporations are entitled to 
First Amendment protection).  Professor Coates describes today’s utilization of the 
First Amendment as a deregulatory tool as a “trump,” as distinct from a “right,” under 
the Constitution, in that business enterprises now cite the First Amendment as a 
means to achieve a different end – profit – from individuals who seek the right to 
speak as an end in itself.  Coates, supra note 123, at 268.  Professor Coates further 
likens our current legal environment to the Lochner era of unquestioned judicial dis-
cretion in lawmaking – or, more specifically, law-unmaking – otherwise reserved for 
the legislatures.  Id. at 269–70. 
 127. See Coates, supra note 123, at 224. 
 128. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010), and the accompanying evidentiary record of over 
100,000 pages.  For an argument supporting the need for a new record, see discussion 
infra Part IV.B.  See generally Renata E. B. Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji, Between 
Access and Influence: Building a Record For the Next Court, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 179 (2014). 
 129. See Shepherd & Kang, supra note 24; Adam Skaggs, Buying Justice: The 
Impact of Citizens United on Judicial Elections, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2010), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/
BCReportBuyingJustice.pdf?nocdn=1.  Note that some Missouri courts, including the 
Supreme Court of Missouri, follow the “Missouri Plan” where a designated commit-
tee of lawyers and judges selects three potential candidates, presents them to the gov-
ernor, and he or she makes a selection from among them.  Missouri Nonpartisan 
Court Plan, YOUR MO. CTS., https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=297 (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2015).  Then the judge must run for reelection after a specified term of 
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likelihood of favorable rulings for donor-backed litigants;130 contributions 
from businesses and other interest groups to the campaigns of state supreme 
court justices were correlated with an increase in favorable decisions for 
business interests in states with partisan judicial elections,131 and even inde-
pendent expenditures in support of state supreme court justices are correlated 
with judicial decisions favorable to the position of donor interests.132  With 
every decision subject to political attack ads, judges are forced to look over 
their shoulders on every ruling, which research has found causes them to set 
aside life sentences in favor of execution for fear of appearing “soft on crime” 
and to more generally rule against criminal defendants at an increased rate, 
particularly during election years.133 
But the evidence does not stop there – recent headlines demonstrate with 
incontrovertible clarity what the majority in Citizens United alleged could 
never occur. Currently, Bob Menendez, Democratic Senator from New Jer-
sey, faces federal corruption charges arising out of political favors he alleged-
ly provided to a contributor who had given concurrently the legal amounts in 
direct donations and over $600,000 to a Super PAC supporting Senator 
Menendez.134  This type of finding appears to breathe new life into Justice 
Stevens’ ferocious dissenting opinion in Citizens United warning of the dan-
gers of indirect campaign finance and to signify the dire need for the compila-
tion of a new McConnell-style record for the future. 
Closer to home, the evidence appears nearly irrefutable that corporate 
monetary interests, both foreign and domestic, led Missouri to revoke its ban 
on foreign ownership of Missouri farmland.135  Following a series of timely 
donations to every member of Missouri’s Senate Agricultural Committee, 
bills were passed – one over Governor Nixon’s veto, the other with his signa-
 
years.  Id.  This is not so for smaller county judges in Missouri who still run in con-
tested elections.  See id. 
 130. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L. 
J. 623, 670–72, tables 7–8 (2009). 
 131. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: 
An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 69, 128 (2011). 
 132. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of 
Judicial Campaign Finance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1306 (2013). 
 133. See Shepherd & Kang, supra note 24.  For a less scholarly, yet profoundly 
persuasive, exposition of this issue, along with some examples of the horrific cam-
paign ads and the accompanying problems to state judiciaries across the nation, see 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Elected Judges (HBO), YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poL7l-Uk3I8. 
 134. See Michael Scherer, The Robert Menendez Corruption Charges Undermine 
the Supreme Court, TIME MAG. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://time.com/3769023/citizens-
united-robert-menendez/. 
 135. Kevin McDermott, Is Missouri’s Agricultural Law Being Rewritten in Hong 
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ture – first expanding the permissibility of foreign acquisition of land to one 
percent of Missouri’s geographic territory, and subsequently opening a loop-
hole to permit far more land to fall into the hands of foreign entities.136  The 
conspicuous timing between donations and the attempts at bill passage, while 
not conclusive evidence of corruption, certainly raise eyebrows as to the in-
tegrity of Missouri’s elected officials. 
B.  Today’s “Crabbed View” of Corruption 
Recognizing the ease with which one may influence Missouri politics 
and the nation more generally is a necessary prerequisite to galvanizing the 
public into taking action.  The majority in Citizens United truncated the defi-
nition of “corruption” utilized in McConnell and its predecessors,137 and 
planted this toothless conceptualization into the analysis of independent elec-
tioneering expenditures, as distinct from direct campaign donations such as 
those at issue in McConnell.138  Did the Court intend to require explicit forms 
of corruption only within the context of independent electioneering expendi-
tures?  Or was it in fact purporting to extend this contracted definition of cor-
ruption across the entirety of campaign finance law?  The rulings in Citizens 
United and McCutcheon together suggest the latter, where “corruption” as-
sumed its narrow and likely rare form – quid pro quo corruption – bribery, in 
essence.139  Is this definition well founded, or does it leave something to be 
desired? 
This Part argues that a broader definition of corruption is essential to 
fully encapsulate the reality of monetary political influence, and that a broad-
er definition may allow for revitalizing regulation to help eliminate the very 
real problems of undue access and influence plaguing legislatures across the 
nation.  Additionally, this Part explores the possibility of reviving the validity 
of alternative “compelling interests” upon which we might justify certain 
elements of campaign finance regulation, some posited previously by liti-
gants, and others the articulations of legal scholars. 
1.  Re-Expanding the Definition of “Corruption” 
The McConnell record contained over 100,000 pages of documents and 
testimony that, according to Justice Breyer, elucidated the “web of relation-
ships and understandings among parties, candidates, and large donors that 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink 
Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000)) (defining corruption as consisting of not 
only quid pro quo exchanges, but also improper influence on an officeholder’s judg-
ment), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010)).  See also 
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001). 
 138. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 145. 
 139. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. 
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underlies privileged access and influence.”140  But, the importance of the 
McConnell record is not in what it found, but in what it did not find – the 
record did “not contain any evidence of bribery or vote buying in exchange 
for donations of nonfederal money.”141  It served as a compilation of clear 
instances of the ability of money to provide specialized, privileged access to 
elected officials, even where no flagrantly corrupt bribery was ever ob-
served.142 
The significance of these findings cannot be overstated, and yet the ma-
jority in both Citizens United and McCutcheon refused to acknowledge that 
money could have any improper influence on the behavior of politicians out-
side the context of flagrant quid pro quo corruption.143  Against the backdrop 
of the McConnell record, how could this be?  How could the Court in Citizens 
United, in defining “corruption,” turn a blind eye to the pervasive access and 
influence that money can buy, made abundantly clear only a few years earli-
er?  The reason is two-fold: (1) the decisions in Citizens United and 
McCutcheon were entirely devoid of a record as relevant and expansive as 
that in McConnell;144 and (2) even in the face of the McConnell record, Jus-
tice Kennedy rejected the notion that corruption could occur as a result of 
access and influence145 – he simply needed to bide his time until a Court 
more amenable to his narrowed definition controlled the bench. 
Justice Kennedy’s “crabbed view” of corruption excluded notions of ac-
cess, influence, and sentiments of indebtedness expounded upon in 
McConnell, even within the context of soft money donations made directly to 
political parties and committees.146  To Justice Kennedy, the only regulable 
conduct was that which has “inherent corruption potential” – i.e. quid pro quo 
 
 140. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1469 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 481 (D.D.C. 2003) 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93). 
 142. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 147–51 (finding, inter alia, that lobbyists, CEOs, 
and individual donors had admitted to donating not for ideological reasons, but for the 
express purpose of securing influence over elected officials; that more than 50% of 
the top donors gave to both parties to ensure legislator compliance; that some senators 
allege that senators base decisions “not [on] what is right or what they believe, but 
how it will affect fundraising[;]” that political parties “sell” increasing degrees of 
personal access to legislators as the size of contributions increase; that several signifi-
cant pieces of legislation were defeated solely because of the influence of large do-
nors). 
 143. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
47–48 (1976)) (“[T]he independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails to serve any substan-
tial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the 
electoral process . . . .”). 
 144. See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 
 145. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314. 
 146. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152 (“This crabbed view of corruption, and par-
ticularly of the appearance of corruption, ignores precedent, common sense, and the 
realities of political fundraising exposed by the record in this litigation.”). 
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exchanges – and nothing more.147  Anything else is merely the garnering of 
ordinary “favoritism and influence,” which is, as he believes, not “avoidable 
in representative politics,” because “[d]emocracy is premised on responsive-
ness.”148  While Justice Kennedy’s point is well taken, it would seem that the 
relevant inquiry is responsiveness to whom?  Should we expect our elected 
representatives to be responsive to the interests of the entirety of their con-
stituency, or merely to those few who have amassed enough wealth to drown 
out the rest and buy access to a legislator’s ear149 – to those who place them 
under the implied (or express) pressure that disloyalty will lead to a with-
drawal of funding, or worse, support for the opposing candidate?150 
The McConnell record revealed the collaborative relationship between 
political parties and the candidates that they support, the fundraising proce-
dures, and the access peddling; does similar behavior occur between candi-
dates for office and today’s PACs that support them?  Do legislators run their 
campaigns and conduct their official duties in such a way so as to appease 
those who made their election possible, even if susceptibility to that influence 
may be subtle, perhaps even unconscious?  Does this knowledge that large 
donors may withdraw their funding, or fund their opponents, in fact bend the 
decision-making of our elected representatives? 
The studies discussed above seem to suggest an affirmative answer to 
each of these questions and indicate that even independent expenditures can 
have tangible effects on the economy, the legislature, and the integrity of the 
judiciary.  But, more is needed.  To buttress the aforementioned findings, 
Professors Renata Strause and Daniel Tokaji together argue that we need 
additional data and research, additional testimony from elected officials, 
campaigners, lobbyists, corporate leaders, and more in order to build a mod-
ern and robust record in support of campaign finance reforms when tried be-
fore for the next Supreme Court.151  Such a record is needed because, as Pro-
fessor Hasen and the Court in Shrink Missouri152 have noted, there exists a 
comparatively higher evidentiary hurdle to proving the validity of limits to 
independent electioneering expenditures, as Court precedent has now largely 
dismissed the possibility that such expenditures can have any corrupting in-
fluence at all.153 
Additionally, the reality of FEC regulation and the politics that surround 
it is that enforcing existing law is next to impossible.  In the upcoming 2016 
 
 147. Id. at 297–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see Citi-
zens United, 558 U.S. at 357; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134, S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
 148. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 297 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
 149. See id. at 147–51 (majority opinion). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Strause & Tokaji, supra note 128, at 220. 
 152. See Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 581, 617 (2011); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 
(2000). 
 153. Id. 
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election, Jeb Bush planned to delegate the bulk of his campaign organization 
to a Super PAC dedicated to his election, the only hitch being the technical 
ban on “coordination” between the candidate and the PAC itself.154  But, the 
FEC is comprised of three Democrats and three Republicans – and, it goes 
without saying that they are “unable to agree on almost anything.”155  As a 
result, many critics believe that the coordination ban can be easily circum-
vented, either by PACs taking cues from the behavior of the candidate-
beneficiaries and their campaigns, by placing staffers in charge of the PACs 
who have had extensive experience with the candidate and their campaign 
tactics, or by simple violation of the ban.156  After all, particularly in today’s 
technological world, surreptitious communication is not exactly a foreign 
concept, and with an FEC divided, policing such behavior can be next to im-
possible.157 
Because the Roberts Court’s opinion on campaign finance regulation 
seems apparent at this point, reformers may be better suited shifting their 
attention toward the future.  Strause and Tokaji argue that the time to begin 
compiling a record for the next court is now, as that data will be of pivotal 
importance in both proving what might otherwise be mere speculation, and in 
addressing the tailoring requirements of strict scrutiny.158  Adequately re-
expanding the definition of corruption in order to support meaningful cam-
paign finance regulation will take both a comprehensive evidentiary record 
and the time necessary to permit the collection of such significant and some-
times sensitive information, and Missouri is as well-positioned as any state to 
participate in conducting the research and in contacting the individuals neces-
sary to contribute to that record. 
2.  Alternative Compelling State Interests 
An expansive evidentiary record is fundamental to lending credibility to 
the otherwise unsubstantiated claims of academics that money corrupts, buys 
access, influences decisions, and so on.  But, the legal theories remain criti-
cally important in that they tie together the evidence and purport to explain 
what we, largely bystanders to this machine, are witnessing unfold.  Addi-
tionally, they provide a framework for passing constitutional muster, as legal 
arguments, together with substantiating evidentiary showings, are what will 
work in tandem to support comprehensive reform. 
 
 154. Thomas Beaumont, Jeb Bush Prepares to Give Traditional Campaign a 
Makeover, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 21, 2015, 2:10 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2015/04/21/jeb-bush-super-pac_n_7110066.html. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Strause & Tokaji, supra note 128, at 220–21. 
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Generally, today’s campaign finance reformers seem to fall into one of 
two camps: the anti-corruption camp or the egalitarian camp.159  For example, 
Professor Daniel Lowenstein argued throughout the late 1980s and early 
1990s that corruption was merely a deviation from a corruption-free baseline 
– he preferred to characterize the issue as one of “conflicts of interest,”160 
quite similar to those inherent in all fiduciary relationships.  In that way, we 
as onlookers would not have to distinguish between what was or was not cor-
ruption, or even what “appeared” to be corruption; instead, a conflict of inter-
est can exist irrespective of any proper or improper behavior.161  Framing the 
issue in terms of conflicting interests, Strause and Tokaji argue, will allow for 
an easier compilation of the requisite evidentiary record, as conflicts of inter-
est should be easier to identify externally relative to the likely impossible task 
of determining the degree to which sentiments of indebtedness interact with 
other competing intrapersonal considerations and capitulations that occur 
“behind closed doors – or simply inside the legislator’s own head.”162 
Strause and Tokaji explain that scholars such as Lawrence Lessig, 
Zephyr Teachout, and Daniel Lowenstein seek a reinvigoration of some form 
of the anti-corruption interest.  They identify Lessig’s “dependence corrup-
tion,” premised on elected officials’ improper dependence on what he calls 
“the funders.”163  Zephyr Teachout describes a broader, historically based 
anti-corruption conception as the “self-serving use of public power for private 
ends,” and as an independent component of the Constitution, much like the 
principles of federalism and of the separation of powers.164  Finally, Low-
enstein details a belief that corruption arises from conflicts of interest inher-
ent in that fiduciary relationship, rather than from any obvious corruption or 
weakness within a specific legislator – in his view, the problem was systemic, 
not individualized.165 
On the anti-distortion, egalitarian side of the debate, Professor Richard 
Hasen has argued that an equality-based interest, such as that upheld in Austin 
and dismissed at length in Citizens United, are in actuality at the heart of Les-
sig’s dependence corruption.  Professor Hasen asserts that, in essence, de-
pendence corruption “seeks to justify campaign finance laws on grounds that 
the laws distribute power fairly and correct a distortion present in an unregu-
 
 159. Id. at 211. 
 160. Id. at 193 (citing Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: 
The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 326 (1989)). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Id. at 215–16. 
 163. Id. at 190–91.  Professor Lessig defines “dependence corruption” as the state 
“of an institution or an individual that has developed a dependence different from a, 
or the, dependence intended or desired.”  Id. at 190 (quoting Lawrence Lessig, A 
Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 65 (2013)). 
 164. Id. at 189 (quoting Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 373–74 (2009)). 
 165. Id. at 193. 
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lated (or less regulated) system.”166  Hasen views the “distortion” as the dis-
proportionate (i.e. unequal) influence over the political process exerted by 
“the funders.”167  Professor Hasen has advocated for a return of this anti-
distortion interest, citing approvingly the rationale put forth in the concurring 
opinion of Judge Guido Calabresi in Ognibene v. Parkes, but asserts that we 
must be ready to distinguish between corporations and the institutional press 
if we really intend to balance the competing interests of free speech and cam-
paign finance.168 
Professor Bruce Cain additionally cited egalitarian concerns in empha-
sizing the importance of equity of participation, influence, and outcome with 
regard to the individuals comprising a democracy.169  To Cain, Strause and 
Tokaji note, attempts at regulating campaign finance based on conceptions of 
corruption are in fact “rooted in a desire to enhance equity.”170 
Professor David Strauss also echoes Hasen’s argument that interests in 
combatting corruption and promoting equality of representation are in fact 
two sides of the same coin.171  He has argued that, in a hypothetical world in 
which every person has an equal contribution to a legislator given in turn for 
a desired action, our concern for corruption melts away.172  After all, how can 
these exchanges be corrupt if everyone is represented equally and is able to 
obtain the policy outcomes they desire? 
 
 166. See id. at 191 (citing Richard L. Hasen, Is “Dependence Corruption” Dis-
tinct From a Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to 
Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L. J. 305, 311 (2013)). 
 167. Id. (citing Hasen, supra note 166, at 311). 
 168. See Hasen, supra note 24, at 36 (quoting Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 
197–98 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, J., concurring)).  Judge Guido Calabresi articulated 
the following: 
 
I agree completely with the Supreme Court that the First Amendment protects 
each person’s right to express political beliefs through money.  Where I disa-
gree with the Court is in its repeated insistence that any recognition of the 
“level playing field” interest (elsewhere referred to as the “antidistortion inter-
est,” Citizens United) is inconsistent with this right.  To the contrary, the anti-
distortion interest promotes this right in two important ways.  First, it prevents 
some speakers from drowning out the speech of others.  And second, it safe-
guards something of fundamental First Amendment importance--the ability to 
have one’s protected expression indicate the intensity of one’s political be-
liefs.  These values, moreover, have not gone unrecognized in underlying First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
 
Id. at 36–37 (quoting Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 197–98 (Calabresi, J., concurring)).   
 169. See Strause & Tokaji, supra note 128, at 194 (citing Bruce E. Cain, Moral-
ism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 111, 135–38 
(1995)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 195 (citing David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign Finance 
Reform?, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 143–44 (1995)). 
 172. Id. 
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C.  So What Is Missouri to Do? 
In spite of everything discussed, recall that Missouri has imposed no 
limitations even on direct campaign donations, the type that the court in 
Buckley concluded gave rise to the possibility of actual quid pro quo corrup-
tion or the appearance thereof, thereby providing an adequate basis for up-
holding legislative enactments regulating that behavior.173  Missouri could 
start by remedying this gaping hole in our campaign finance laws, and in 
doing so eliminate the possibility of this most obvious form of corruption,174 
while simultaneously improving the faith Missourians have in the integrity of 
our state government.  Such a law would be upheld under Supreme Court 
precedent extending as far back as Buckley, and Missouri could again join the 
staggering majority of the nation in combatting the permissiveness of a pro-
cedurally and ethically flawed democracy. 
To dismantle the conflicts of interest inherent in accepting gifts and lav-
ish dinners from lobbyists, Missouri legislators could stop dragging their feet 
and support their fellow representatives who have drafted bills and who are 
working tirelessly to end the charade.175  Missouri could ban, as many other 
states have done, lobbyist gifts beyond a small amount176 and ensure that 
what disclosure requirements we do have are not being circumvented.177  To 
ensure that the interests of Missouri representatives are really in accord with 
the interests of their constituents, ban their ability to become special interest 
lobbyists immediately or shortly after resigning from office, and make that 
time bar a meaningful duration such that “waiting out the holding period” 
will never seem like a viable option.178 
 
 173. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). 
 174. For a particularly disturbing account of the command that even individual 
donors can have over Missouri politics, see Steve Kraske, The Money In Politics Is 
Out Of Control, KAN. CITY STAR (Jan. 30, 2015, 5:19 PM), http://www.kansas
city.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/local-columnists/article8812862.html. 
 175. See Young, supra note 1.  Senate Majority Leader Ron Richard (R-Joplin) 
and Senator Rob Schaaf (R-St. Joseph) have made such attempts.  Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Legislator Gift Restrictions Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-
gift-laws.aspx.  See also Bribery and Kickback Laws: State Legislators, 0060 
SURVEYS 26 (2014) (listing the statutes of many states’ bans on gifts in addition to 
their laws covering bribery and kickbacks). 
 177. The Jeff City Gift Culture, by the Numbers, PROGRESS MO. (Sept. 8, 2015, 
3:28 PM), http://www.progressmissouri.org/gifts (describing how lobbyists and other 
donors would list the gifts as having been given to entire committees or the entire 
General Assembly in order to avoid disclosing the individual names of legislators). 
 178. See Virginia Young, Missouri Bill Would Regulate ‘Revolving Door’ Be-
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What Missouri cannot do is ban independent electioneering expendi-
tures,179 and it cannot place aggregate limits on the amount that individual 
donors may spend supporting various candidates or their committees.180  To 
remove those impediments, Missouri can put our best and brightest to work: 
students, researchers, scholars, political scientists, jurists, professors, judges, 
the news media, lawyers, and even the public at large have a role to play.  
Many of those mentioned can assist in compiling the data and evidentiary 
record necessary to support the next Supreme Court challenge, and others can 
endeavor to refine the legal theories that may persuade this or the next Court. 
But more generally, Missouri needs an informed electorate, a public 
who knows the amount and influence of money in politics not just in Mis-
souri, but all across the country – this information being something that jour-
nalists may bear some responsibility in presenting to the public across all 
media platforms.  Additionally, in the era of social media, even the Missouri 
citizenry itself can help in raising awareness of this most fundamental of is-
sues.  We all may have our “pet” issues in politics, but none of them can 
meaningfully and accurately be addressed if the voice of the majority is inun-
dated by a tsunami of monetary influence representing only a small slice of 
the populace.  As Professor Lawrence Lessig has said: 
[T]here is no sensible reform possible until we end this corruption. . . .  
It’s not that mine is the most important issue.  It’s not.  Yours is the 
most important issue, but mine is the first issue – the issue we have to 
solve before we get to fix the issues you care about.181 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There exists today a disconnect between the popular will and the behav-
ior of our elected representatives, a break in the “chain of communication”182 
between the people and corresponding government action.  It has become the 
norm that policies favored by a supermajority of the electorate remain noth-
ing more than dead bills sitting in committees.183  Monetary influence has 
 
 179. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 180. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 181. See Lawrence Lessig, We the People, and the Republic We Must Reclaim, 
TED (Feb. 2013), http://www.ted.com/talks/lawrence_lessig_we_the_people_and_the
_republic_we_must_reclaim?language=en#t-1956 (the relevant portion begins around 
10:30). 
 182. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting J. WILSON, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 30–31 
(1792)). 
 183. See, e.g., Scott Clement, 90 Percent of Americans Want Expanded Back-
ground Checks On Guns. Why Isn’t This a Political Slam Dunk?, WASH. POST (Apr. 
3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/04/03/90-percent-
of-americans-want-expanded-background-checks-on-guns-why-isnt-this-a-political-
slam-dunk/ (noting that senate reluctance to pass any type of gun reform despite 
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inundated the political process, and in states like Missouri, almost nothing is 
being done to prevent the resulting flagrant corruption.184  In fact, as noted 
above, Missouri has backtracked in many ways over the past decade.185  The 
Supreme Court of United States decisions in Citizens United and McCutch-
eon have unleashed special interest spending like this nation has never seen 
before, and it threatens to further erode public trust in government.  Where 
faith in government is lacking, participation smacks of futility, and those 
most disenfranchised will fail to take action to vindicate their rights, and per-
haps rationally so. 
Hopefully this Note has shed light on the manner in which Supreme 
Court First Amendment jurisprudence has hampered the ability of the Mis-
souri legislature to take corrective action in our ethics and campaign finance 
laws, but not precluded it.  Missouri can still make changes to eliminate the 
possibility of quid pro quo corruption by re-enacting campaign donation lim-
its; it can deny lobbyists the undue access and influence they currently exert 
over our elected representatives by banning gifts; and Missouri can eliminate 
the revolving door policies currently enjoyed between public and private em-
ployment.  Additionally, Missouri can play a part in compiling an evidentiary 
record to help support the validity of one or more compelling state interests in 
campaign finance and ethics regulation before this or a future Supreme Court, 
which will free Missouri and the nation more generally to enact policies that 
promote the representativeness of our democracy.  If we can do that, then 
perhaps this nation can continue the fight, perhaps with another Court, over 
the more long-term issues associated with the preservation of our republican 
form of government. 
 
overwhelming public support was the result of, inter alia, a fear over possible NRA 
backlash). 
 184. See supra Parts II–III. 
 185. See supra Part II. 
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